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Globalization and health worker crisis: what do wealth-effects tells us?
 
Abstract
Owing  to  lack  of  relevant  data  on  health  human  resource  migration,  the  empirical 
dimension of the health-worker  crisis  debate has remained void despite  abundant  theoretical 
literature. A health worker crisis is overwhelming the world. Shortages in health professionals 
are  reaching staggering  levels  in  many parts  of  the  globe.  This  paper  complements  existing 
literature  by  empirically  investigating  the  WHO hypothetical  determinants  of  health-worker 
migration in the context of globalization when income-levels matter. In plainer terms, the work 
explores how the wealth of exporting countries play-out in the determinants of HHR emigration. 
We assess  the  determinants  of   emigration  in  the  health  sector  through-out  the  conditional 
distribution  of  health  human  resource  emigration.  Findings  provide  very  targeted  policy 
implications based on income-levels and existing emigration levels for both physician and nurse 
worker crises. Beside specific policy recommendations, we also outlined broad policy measures 
for source-countries, recipient-states and regional(international) institutions.
JEL Classification: D60; F22; I10; J24; O15
Keywords:  Welfare; Health; Human Capital; Migration
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1. Introduction
Globalization is to some extent responsible in various ways for causing the ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ conditions which have contributed to chronic problems in Health Human Resources(hence 
HHRs).  Deteriorating  socio-economic  and  environmental  conditions(partly  attributable  to 
liberalization and  other forms of global market integration) are pushing health workers out of 
their countries. Conditions linked to loans or debt relief from international financial institutions 
have  limited  governments’  ability  to  pay  adequate  salaries  or  provide  incentives  for  health 
workers to remain. As a results, physicians and nurses are being pushed-out and governments are 
hard-pressed to implement effectives remedies to curb the exodus. The movement of HHRs is 
asymmetrical and tilted towards developed(rich) countries, with the poorest countries unable to 
attract replacement workers. For countries unable to draw-in new health workers to replace those 
who have left for greener pastures, the inevitable effect is diminished health care access and 
service. 
Globalization is making it easier for rich countries to ‘pull-in’ HHRs. Border barriers in 
rich countries are being actively lowered for technical, professional and skilled workers. The 
principal  destination-countries  of  HHRs  are  five,  predominantly  English  speaking  OECD 
countries: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These countries deficient of 
HHRs are increasingly relying on the immigration of foreign-trained health workers to relieve 
them in exchange for higher pay, better working conditions and greater opportunities. More so 
beside these push and pull factors are a number of other features associated with globalization 
which further foster HHR migration, notably the internationalization of professional credentials, 
citizenship  and  remittances.  Thus  professional  credentials  in  health  and  other  fields  are 
increasingly recognized across borders particularly where free trade zones have been established. 
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Professional  credentials  are  now  serving  as  passports  and  other  factors  that  ease 
migration(multilingualism,  post-colonial  ties,  common academic  curricula…etc)  and mobility 
(cheaper,  faster  and easier  travel)  have  contributed  to  a  veritable  sense  of  global  belonging 
(citizenship).  The  opportunity  to  accumulate  savings  and  remit  portions  to  family  and 
communities back home is a significant pull for HHR migration. Thus  remittances represent 
important private welfare gains and seriously influence the HHR migration decision(Packer et 
al.,2007).
 In  this  paper  we  examine  how  the  wealth  of  exporting  countries  play-out  in  the 
determinants of HHR emigration. In plainer terms, the work explores whether factors affecting 
HHR migration  play-out  differently  in  low-income countries  in  comparison  to  their  middle-
income counterparts. The choice of the African continent is most relevant because it is facing 
serious HHR crisis in the health sector. While medical tourism in Asia and Latin America is 
seriously deterring HHR emigration(as patients from developed countries move there for more 
readily and affordable treatments), African health system infrastructures are not solid enough to 
attract  foreign-patients.  Over  the  past  two  decades  the  African  population  has  increased 
substantially,  with  a  significant  surge  in  disease  burden  due  to  HIV/AIDS  and  recurrent 
communicable diseases as well as an increased incidence in  noncommunicable diseases. This 
increased demand for health services has been met with a rather low supply of health workers. 
According to Packer et al.(2007), Africa has a 25% share in the global diseases burden, a share 
in population of 13.76% but only a 1.3% share in health service. Therefore findings of the paper 
could  provide  very  relevant  policies  implications  if  the  determinants  of  HHR migration  are 
different across income and emigration levels. 
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The paper’s contribution to the literature is threefold. (1) Despite the abundant theoretical 
literature  on the subject  matter,   lack of relevant  data on health  professional  migration   has 
rendered it  empirically  void over  the last  decades.  Thus we complement  existing theoretical 
literature by providing a pioneering empirical dimension to the migration-development nexus of 
the health sector. (2) The WHO report on globalization and health worker crisis presents to the 
best of our knowledge the most exhaustive and detailed theoretical globalization-underpinnings 
of  the  health-worker  crisis(Packer  et  al.,2007).  Empirically  investigating  hypothetical 
determinants postulated in the report when income-levels matter in the context of globalization 
could  have  relevant  policy  implications.  (3)  Examining  determinants  of  health  professional 
migration through-out the conditional distribution of health-worker migration could also provide 
results  with  more  focused  policy  measures.  The  logic  behind  this  dynamic  analysis  is  that,  
countries  with  the  best  and  worst  health-worker  emigration  fighting  records  may  respond 
differently to the determinants outlined in the WHO report.  Therefore if existing emigration-
levels  matter  in  the  assessment  of  emigration  determinants,  then  blanket  emigration-control 
policies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different levels of emigration. It 
follows that, to be effective immigration policies would have to be contingent on the prevailing 
levels  of  the  crisis  and  tailored  differently  across  the  best  and  worst  brain-drain  fighting 
countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature. Data 
is presented and methodology outlined in Section 3. Empirical analysis, discussion and policy 
implications are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Existing literature 
2.1 Globalization and cross-border care of patients 
Cross-border  importing(exporting)  of  health  workers  and  exporting(importing)  of 
patients is becoming a veritable industry and booming worldwide. A decade past, the medical 
tourism industry was hardly noticeable. A great bulk of literature has emphasized the substantial 
nature of this industry: in 2002, while the number of   foreign patients travelling to India for 
medical  care  was  150  000,  it  increased   in  2005  to  approximately  half  a  million 
(Hutchinson,2005; Rosenmoller et al.,2006); by 2007,  250 000 patients were visiting Singapore 
alone on a yearly basis, with half of them from the Middle East(Packer et al.,2007)…etc.  A 
number of reasons explain the boom of this medical industry.  Patients faced with significant 
waiting  lists  for  medical  care  or  high costs  of  treatment  seek care  in  other  countries  where 
treatment is readily available and/or affordably priced1. 
India is the leading country promoting medical tourism and it is estimated that tourism of 
this kind is growing by 20% each year(Packer et al., 2007). In a declaration by India’s National  
Health Policy, the treatment of foreign patients is legally an “export” and “eligible for all fiscal 
incentives extended to export earning”. Government and private sector studies in the country 
estimate that medical-tourism could bring as much as between US$1 billion and $2 billion into the 
country  by  2012.   The  country  is  also  moving  into  a  new area  of  medical  outsourcing  where  
subcontractors  provide  services  to  overburdened  medical  care  systems  in  developed  countries 
(Macintosh, 2004). 
Thailand has also espoused this industry,  with the Thai Consulate General in Canada for 
example advertising medical tourism in Thailand for Canadians by listing prices in US dollars for  
1 With respect to Packer et al.(2007), in one study waiting-time for a heart bypass in the UK could last up to 6 
months and cost the NHS between 15,000 and 19,000 pounds, whereas a large pool of well qualified doctors in India 
will  readily  perform the  surgery  at  a  cost  of  4,800 pounds.  For  hospitals  and  clinics  in  developing  countries  
receiving these patients, their treatment brings-in important revenue and desirable foreign exchange. 
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various surgeries on its website. In line with Packer et al.(2007), 600 000 foreign patients in 2005  
sought treatment in Thailand. This figure was expected to grow by 66% by the end of 2006 and 
projections (by the country’s  ambitious national health plan of action) hold that the country will  
become a medical hub of excellence by 2020 with an estimated number of foreign patients increasing  
to 10 million that year.  This ambitious plan also entails negative consequences for Thai citizens as  
the Ministry of Health is noting a substantial shift in HHRs (to the private sector) from the public  
sector on which about 90% of the Thai population depends. Though steps to curb the within-country  
HHR migration are yet unclear, it is nonetheless anticipated that fewer health workers will seek to  
leave the country to work abroad.
While some analysts believe this cross-border treatment of patients could be an answer to  
unethical waiting lists for patients and structural(temporal)  shortages in domestic HHRs(Tjadens,  
2002),  critics  of  cross-border  care  point  to  a  number  of  major  flaws.  Firstly,  patients  receiving 
treatment abroad may be awarded lower quality care, thus putting their health at risk. Patients may 
also be treated by foreign HHRs in a language they do not understand. Secondly, cross-border health-
care discriminates in favor of wealthy patients (able to pay for the services), thus rendering access to  
health-care increasingly unequal. Thirdly, in countries with insufficient HHRs, promoting medical  
tourism discriminates  in  favor  of  rich  foreigners.  Finally,  income accruing  from health  tourism 
typically(but not always) enter into the coffers of private clinics; implying the revenues end up in 
private pockets(accounts) and are not ploughed back into the public health system. 
A position in favor of or against cross-border care is not very clear-cut, as there are shifting  
costs and benefits to the countries involved. Cross-border health care supply is for the most part  
organized as a private system(with private providers, private insurance or co-payments and private 
facilities) and benefits only those who can afford it.  Nay, from a heath equity standpoint, public  
systems allow access to services(though they may be imperfect  on the basis of need rather than  
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ability to pay) with costs being met through cross-subsidization. Borrowing from Packer et al.(2007),  
policy measures  governments are facing are whether to value equity in health care  access  or simply  
to increase aggregate access without regard to who benefits. Thus for effective  management with 
insurance of equitable access and HHR flows, the prevailing system in the European Union(EU)  
could provide a global model. Nonetheless a large number of countries must agree to some form of 
supranational regulatory framework for such flows, premised on equity in health service access. In  
the meantime  the inevitable cross-border care as a backup to domestic health care systems will  
continue(Rai,  2006),  with  insurance  companies  in  particular  increasingly  gauging  out-of-country  
treatments as low-cost solutions. 
2.2 Globalization’s drivers of migration  
2.2.1 Framing the drivers 
There  are  various  ways  of  framing  and  understanding  how  globalization  influences 
migration   and  ultimately  health  service.   Firstly,  HHR migration  is  inherently  a  defining 
characteristic of globalization(i.e., increased movement of people). Thus border barriers in rich 
countries  for professional,  technical  and skilled  immigrants  are  being lifted,  in  contrast  to  a 
dwindling acceptance rate of semi or less skilled migrants(UNFPA,2005). Globalization(in the 
forms of trade and investment liberalizations) leads to increased per capita GDP and could also 
improve the general health of a population(Packer et al.,2007). This is through reductions in 
poverty and commodity prices, while providing increased taxable income that could be invested 
in  public  health  systems.  These  effects  should  mitigate  a  source  country’s  push  factors. 
According  to  Bundred  et  al.(2004),  most  low-income  economies  from  which  a  significant 
number of health workers are migrating still lack the capital investment to develop their health 
systems. Evidence of per capita GDP trickling-down to mitigate poverty is mixed at best.
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Secondly,  HHR migration can also be conceived as a problem requiring global policy 
intervention(that is, increased health inequities arising from lack of workers in poorer countries 
with high disease burdens). Within this framework, the empirical relationship of globalization’s 
drivers and HHR migration is less of a concern than is the obligation or duty of all nations to 
manage HHR flows in a way that does not compromise their legal or normative commitments 
under human right treaties(for example the right to health) or development goals(notably the 
MDGs). 
Thirdly, HHR migration is the result of other characteristics of globalization(increase in 
other  factors  that  push workers  out  of  their  countries).  In  this  framing  of  the concern,  it  is 
imperative to examine the extent to which  different aspects of globalization lead to increased 
HHR migration. These could be clubbed into the following strands: 
-specific policies to overproduce and export in order to achieve a better balance of payments 
through remittances(in part to create domestic conditions more favorable to foreign investors or 
lenders);
-deteriorating  socio-economic  and environmental  conditions  at  least  partly  and substantively 
attributable, inter alia, to liberalization and  other forms of global market integration;
-conditions  associated  with  grants,  debt  relief  and  loans  from  international  financial 
institutions(IMF, World Bank and regional development banks) that could limit governments’ 
ability to provide incentives to retain HHRs or pay adequate salaries;
-eased migration restrictions on the flows of HHRs from lower to higher-income nations with 
perceived  HHR  deficits,  especially  emigration  of  those  with  internationally  accredited 
qualifications such as physicians and nurses(Bundred et al.,2004). 
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2.2.2 Post-colonial and linguistic ties 
According  to  Packer  et  al.(2007),  post-colonial  ties  which  enable  countries  to 
continue to share customs, languages and curricula are  important factors in the choice of the 
country of destination. For this reason, Southern African or Caribbean nurses emigrate to the 
UK, Canada and Australia. A survey on preferred countries of professionals’ destination in 5 
Southern African countries found 31.6% desired to emigrate to North America, 27.5% to the 
UK and 8.0% to Australia/ New Zealand. Also, 28.8% preferred emigrating to their neighbor 
South  Africa(Crush  et  al.,  2005).  A great  many  medical  institutions  in  Southern  Africa 
prepare  students  to  work  with  diseases  and  facilities  that  are  compatible  with  Western 
medical settings(English language of instruction and Western medical texts books). It follows 
that  medical  degrees  from  Southern  Africa,  particularly  those  from  English-speaking 
countries have standards similar to Western degrees, hence enabling them to practice abroad 
or  indirectly encouraging them to do so. 
2.2.3 Push and pull factors
In  line  with  the  literature(Crush,2002;  Bundred et  al.,2004),  different  individuals  are 
motivated  to  move  for  different  reasons;  typically  they are  pushed-out  of  their  countries  or 
pulled-in to recruiting countries by differences in working conditions. Borrowing from Packer et 
al.(2007), owing to the country-specific nature of the motivations, we shall restrict the  main 
determinants of emigration into push and pull factors as summarized in Table 1. In addition to 
these factors, an unappealing by-product from decades of increasing HHR migration is the well-
developed culture of medical-migration. As pointed-out by Hagopian et al.(2005), this culture 
has  become  firmly  rooted  in  many  source  and  receiving  countries.  The  phenomenon  is 
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increasingly  encouraged  with   medical  school  faculties   often   serving  as  role  models  of 
emigration; as they are proud of their students who successfully emigrate. Thus it is interesting 
to break-down factors behind HHR migration in order to understand how global HHR crisis may 
be solved. 
Policy-makers are often confronted with the fundamental question of whether push or 
pull factors are more responsible for HHR emigration. It is necessary to deal with both types of 
factors in controlling for the spiraling of the crisis, however informed opinion argues that push 
factors weigh-in more(Packer et al.,2007). There are a number of reasons for this position:
-individuals  characteristically cite push factors over pull factors as primary reasons for their 
intention or decision to migrate. For example, a survey of the factors cited by university students 
in six Southern African countries for wanting to migrate reveals cost of living, inability to find 
relevant jobs, low income, lack of prospects for professional advancement and inability to find 
relevant jobs; with personal and family security being the most important(Crush et al.,2005);
-even with the absence of jobs in developed countries for health professionals, migration will 
still take place at a reduced rate, in view of other security reasons cited above;
-substantial differences in pay within and between countries represent significant push and pull 
factors(Thomas et al., 2005; Hagopian et al.,2005);
-for the most part,  source developing countries experience severe HHR shortages themselves 
accompanied by stress, lack of supplies and a generalized ability to practice effectively;
-there  is  little  evidence  that  a  significant  number  of  doctors(nurses)  return  to  their  source 
countries to practice,  ostensibly because conditions that led to their  departure have remained 
unchanged. 
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Table 1: Summary on push and pull factors of HHR migration 
Push Factors Pull Factors
Job Security
* No jobs available 
* Lack of promotions 
* Risk of losing jobs due to lack of funds 
* Jobs available 
* Information from  colleagues, friends and recruiters 
about opportunities
* Fairness in granting promotions 
Working Conditions
* Deteriorating working environment/facilities
* Inadequate  medicine and equipment 
* Inability to treat patients appropriately
* Unhappiness with prevalent social attitudes towards 
the nurse profession 
* Significant stress, overtime and generally poor 
conditions of service resulting to fatigue 
* Deplorable patient-health care service ratios, which 
decrease quality care
* Job satisfaction in the nursing and medicine practices
* Reasonable workload and  better working conditions
Economic Considerations
* Disarray in several economically depressed countries 
* Low salaries
* Inability to accrue savings 
* Non-payment of salaries, housing allowance and 
pensions
* Higher pay(and opportunities for remittances)
* Reasonable remuneration–with savings opportunities
* Recruiters actively searching workers internationally 
with the promise of high income
Political Considerations
* Political, racial and ethnic upheavals 
* Gender discrimination 
* Government training of workers for international 
export 
* OECD countries  are wealthy, stable and democratic 
* Absence of corruption
Physical Security
* Criminality
* Gender-based violence 
* Exposure risk to HIV 
* Safe country 
* Safe working environment 
* Appropriate medical equipment to prevent HIV 
infection
Quality of Life
* Poor accommodation
* Lack of transport means to work
* Inability to live a decent life
* Multi-ethnicity and tolerance of diversity 
* Good quality of life 
Education
* Diminishing quality of education for children * Greater opportunities ,good education and improved 
living standards for children
Source: Packer et al.(2007)
Ultimately greater emphasis must be placed on diminishing the push factors that force 
doctors(nurses) out of source countries in large numbers in the first place. Retention efforts will  
be void of success unless fundamental socio-economic and labor conditions that push workers to 
leave in the first place are improved. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
Table 2 below summarizes HHR determinants  with respect to push factors  outlined in 
Table 1. The data is cross-sectional because HHR migration data is only available for the year 
2000. HHR variables entail both physician and nurse emigration rates while their  determinants 
entail  aspects  of  job  security(GDP  per  capita  growth  and  health  expenditure),  economic 
considerations(savings,  inflation  and  population  growth),  physical  security(freedom  and 
government effectiveness), political  considerations(democracy and corruption-control),  quality 
of life(human development index, development assistance and HIV infection rate), education 
(tertiary emigration rate) and globalization(trade openness and capital liberalization). While the 
dependent  variables  are   from  Clemens  &  Pettersson(2006),  the  independent  and  control 
variables are obtained from Freedom House and African Development Indicators(ADI) of the 
World Bank(WB).  Summary statistics and correlation analysis(with presentation of countries) 
are detailed in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. 
From intuition and the literature(Packer  et  al.,  2007), we expect improvements  in job 
security, economic growth,  political morality,  physical security  and ‘quality of life’ to deter 
HHR emigration.  Globalization determinants  could  either  fuel  or  mitigate  the HHR crisis 
depending on circumstances. On the hand, globalization by definition implies border-barriers in 
rich countries for professionals, technical and skilled immigrants are being lifted(UNFPA,2005). 
On the other hand, the phenomenon(in terms of trade and investment liberalizations) may lead to 
increased per capita GDP and rate of foreign patients(medical tourism),  thus mitigating push 
factors(Packer et al.,2007). 
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Table 2: Selected HHR variables
Factors Variables Definitions Sources
Panel A:  Outcome variables(Health Human Resource Emigration)
Health Worker
Emigration
Physicians Physician emigration rate(% of total physicians) Clemens & 
Pettersson(2006)
Nurses Nurse emigration rate(% of total nurses) Clemens & 
Pettersson(2006)
Panel B: Independent  and control variables
Job Security GDP per capita growth  GDP per capita growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Health Expenditure  Health Expenditure(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Economic 
Considerations 
Savings Gross Savings(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Inflation Consumer Price Index World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Population growth rate(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Political 
Considerations 
Democracy Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Control of Corruption Control of Corruption(Estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Physical 
Security 
Freedom Press Freedom Freedom House 
Government Effectiveness Government Effectiveness(Estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Quality of life 
IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index World Bank(WDI)
Development  Assistance Net Official Development Assistance(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
HIV  Infection rate Prevalence of HIV(% of  population ages 15-49) World Bank(WDI)
Education Tertiary emigration Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total 
tertiary educated population)
World Bank(WDI)
Globalization Foreign Investment Foreign Direct Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Trade Openness Exports plus Imports(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. 
3.2 Methodology 
To determine if existing HHR emigration levels matter in the fight against health-worker 
brain-drain we borrow from Billger & Goel(2009) and recent Africa development literature in 
using  quantile  regression(Asongu,  2012abc).  This  technique  enables  us  to  investigate  if  the 
relationship  between  HHR  emigration  and  the  exogenous  variables  differ  throughout  the 
distribution of the dependent variable(Koenker & Hallock, 2001). Studies on the determinants of 
HHR migration based on Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) estimation report parameter estimates at 
the conditional mean of HHR migration. While mean effects are certainly important, this study 
expands such findings by using Quantile Regression(QR). In addition,  one of the underlying 
assumptions of OLS regression is that the error term and the dependent variable are normally 
distributed. However QR does not require a normally distributed error term. Therefore, based on 
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this technique we are able to carefully assess the determinants of HHR emigration throughout the 
conditional distribution with particular emphasis on countries with the best and worst fighting 
records of HHR emigration. QR yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional 
distribution of the dependent  variable(Koenker  & Bassett,  1978) and has gained attention in 
recent development literature(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth,2012; Asongu, 2012abc). 
The  θ th quantile estimator of the dependent variable is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem.
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Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS which is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations.  For instance the 75 th or 90th 
quantiles(with  θ =0.75  or  0.90  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is :
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation 
is analogous to  βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope albeit parameters are estimated only at the 
mean  of  the conditional  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable.  For  the  model  in  Eq.(2)  the 
dependent  variable  iy  is  the  HHR emigration  indicator  while  ix  contains  a  constant   term, 
human  development,  trade,  democracy,  press-freedom,  savings,  health  expenditure,  inflation, 
development assistance, tertiary emigration, economic prosperity, population growth, corruption-
control, government effectiveness and HIV infection rate. The quantile estimation technique is 
more robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers  when the distribution of the 
dependent variable is a highly non-normal pattern(Okada & Samreth,  2012; Asongu, 2012a). 
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We also report estimates for Least Absolute Deviations(LAD) which should correspond to those 
of the 0.5th  quantile. 
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Summary of results 
The results presented in Tables 3-7 include OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS estimates 
provide a baseline of mean effects  and we compare these to estimates of LAD and separate 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of HHR emigration. 
Table 3: Summary of results
Physician emigration Nurse emigration
LICs MICs LICs MICs
BQ TQ BQ TQ BQ TQ BQ TQ
Job Security Economic Prosperity + + na + + - - +
Health Expenditure - - + - + na + na
Economic 
Considerations
Savings + + + - + na + na
Inflation + - + - + + + na
Population + - - + + - - -
Political 
Considerations
Democracy na + na na + + na +
Corruption control - + - na - + - -
Physical 
Security
Freedom na + na na na + na +
Government Effectiveness + - + + + - + +
Quality of life
Human Development + + na - + na na -
Development  Assistance + + + na + na + +
HIV Infection rate + + - na na - - -
Globalization Financial openness na + na na + na na +
Trade openness - - na - na - na -
Education Tertiary emigration + + + na + - + +
BQ:Bottom Quantiles. TQ: Top Quantiles. LICs : Low Income Countries. MICs: Middle Income Countries.  na: not applicable due to 
insignificance of estimated coefficient. 
Table  3  above  presents  a  summary  of  overall  findings.  In  the  interpretation  of  the 
findings  note  should  be  taken  of  the  fact  that  Low Quantiles(LQ)  denote   the  part  of  the 
emigration distribution where existing levels of brain-drain are less, while Top Quantiles(TQ) 
represent  the  side  of  the  distribution  where  existing  levels  of  brain-drain  are  high.  The 
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heterogeneous nature of findings across the distribution of the dependent variable points to the 
relevance of an estimation approach that is conditional on existing levels of HHR emigration. 
Our  estimation  technique  is  further  justified  by  the  insignificance  of  OLS estimates  across 
specifications(see Tables 4-7).  The positive signs(+) denote increase in HHR emigration while 
negative signs(-) indicate the contrary.
4.1.1 Wealth effects for Physician migration
Income-level effects for physician migration  are captured by cross-examining Table 4 
and Table 5. With respect to the first specification, the following could be established. (1) LAD 
and OLS estimates are not significant and only the top quantile results are mostly significant  for  
both  income  groups.  (2)  While  human  development,  democracy and press-freedom increase 
HHR emigration in Low Income Countries(LICs), the opposite effect is witnessed in Middle 
Income  Countries(MICs).  (3)  For  LICs,  while  trade  openness  is  a  tool  for  fighting  HHR 
emigration, financial liberalization is not.
With regard to the second specification. (1)  Health expenditure decreases incentives to 
HHR emigration for both income-levels, but while the negative effect is consistent across the 
distribution in LICs, it is only relevant in the top quantiles of their MICs  counterparts. (2) Brian-
drain is deterred by domestic savings only in MICs(in top quantiles). (3) With the exception of 
health  expenditure  for  LICs,  savings,  inflation  and development  assistance  are  incentives  to 
HHR emigration; with the relevance across the distribution for LICs and only in lower quantiles 
for MICs.
Looking at the third specification, the following could be established. (1) While the HIV 
infection rate increases emigration in LICs, it deters the phenomenon in their MIC counterparts. 
(2) Economic prosperity is not a tool in the fight against emigration for both income-levels. (3)  
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Whereas population  growth is  a tool  at  bottom quantiles  of MICs, it  is  relevant  only in the 
highest quantile of LICs as a deterrent to emigration. (4) While Government effectiveness fights 
emigration in top quantiles of LICs, it only helps to increase the crisis in MICs. (5) Corruption-
control is a tool against emigration only in lower quantiles of both income groups.  
Table 4: Determinants of Physician Migration in LICs : OLS, LAD and QR 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.284 -0.349 -0.139 -0.322** -0.349 -0.382 -0.162
(0.381) (0.633) (0.421) (0.013) (0.274) (0.151) (0.472)
Human  Development  1.166 1.304 1.120** 1.635*** 1.304* 1.413** 0.129
(0.116) (0.578) (0.012) (0.000) (0.077) (0.025) (0.789)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.074 0.048 0.029 0.025 0.048 0.040 0.122***
(0.158) (0.735) (0.292) (0.163) (0.328) (0.320) (0.005)
Trade -0.003 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.002** -0.0002 -0.001 -0.003*
(0.285) (0.982) (0.680) (0.011) (0.919) (0.393) (0.096)
Democracy  0.019 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.030* 0.050***
(0.363) (0.938) (0.796) (0.572) (0.801) (0.096) (0.006)
Freedom 0.004 0.003 0.0002 0.003 0.003 0.005* 0.008***
(0.217) (0.833) (0.895) (0.014) (0.283) (0.067) (0.003)
Observations  1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Specification 2
Constant 0.177 0.362 -0.200*** 0.280*** 0.362*** 0.368*** 0.281***
(0.299) (0.315) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Savings  0.003 0.001 0.007*** 0.003** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.235) (0.895) (0.000) (0.018) (0.012) (0.000) (0.044)
Health Expenditure  -0.010 -0.043 0.002 -0.034** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.023***
(0.761) (0.570) (0.394) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Inflation 0.006 0.006 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.005***
(0.135) (0.462) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Development Assistance 0.007 0.006 0.016*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.023***
(0.276) (0.647) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary Emigration 0.005* 0.005 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.077) (0.567) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Specification 3
Constant 0.397** 0.313 0.142 0.195*** 0.313*** 0.479*** 0.460***
(0.021) (0.542) (0.225) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity  0.020 0.021 0.026** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.019***
(0.174) (0.581) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population growth -0.008 0.003 0.029 0.029*** 0.003 -0.007 -0.007***
(0.787) (0.976) (0.257) (0.000) (0.694) (0.300) (0.000)
Corruption Control  0.029 0.064 -0.054 -0.009*** 0.064 0.333*** 0.396***
(0.814) (0.786) (0.581) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 0.072 -0.044 0.097 0.123*** -0.044 -0.066** -0.072***
(0.543) (0.881) (0.295) (0.000) (0.203) (0.018) (0.000)
HIV 0.025** 0.020 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.042*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.464) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Notes.  Dependent variable is the emigration physician rate.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.10) signify nations where  emigration is least. OLS:Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. LICs: Low 
Income Countries. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Physician Migration in MICs : OLS, LAD and QR 
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.513 1.233 0.013 0.013 1.233*** 0.594 0.594**
(0.549) (0.898) (0.951) (0.951) (0.000) (0.103) (0.044)
Human  Development  -0.003 -0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.008*** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.609) (0.999) (0.139) (0.137) (0.000) (0.044) (0.017)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.001 -0.046 0.005 0.005 -0.046*** 0.002 0.002
(0.977) (0.865) (0.710) (0.708) (0.000) (0.883) (0.833)
Trade -0.0003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.0009*** -0.001 -0.001*
(0.886) (0.990) (0.191) (0.189) (0.003) (0.169) (0.080)
Democracy  -0.004 -0.043 -0.004 -0.004 -0.043*** 0.005 0.005
(0.934) (0.955) (0.773) (0.771) (0.000) (0.766) (0.670)
Freedom -0.003 -0.011 0.0007 0.0007 -0.011*** -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.723) (0.900) (0.748) (0.747) (0.000) (0.727) (0.619)
Observations  1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Specification 2
Constant -0.108 -0.440 -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.440*** 0.849** 0.849***
(0.793) (0.966) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.0113) (0.009)
Savings  -0.0003 0.001 0.0009 0.0009** 0.001** -0.007** -0.007***
(0.918) (0.985) (0.100) (0.045) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Health Expenditure  0.026 0.045 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.045*** -0.044** -0.044**
(0.511) (0.979) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.041)
Inflation 0.007 0.027 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.027*** -0.023* -0.023**
(0.718) (0.841) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.053) (0.044)
Development Assistance 0.041 0.060 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.060*** -0.007 -0.007
(0.238) (0.815) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.556) (0.527)
Tertiary Emigration 0.008* 0.009 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001
(0.092) (0.850) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.404) (0.373)
Observations 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Specification 3
Constant 0.552 0.548 0.886*** 0.886** 0.548** -0.006 -0.006
(0.329) (0.916) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.975) (0.964)
Economic Prosperity  0.004 0.013 -0.011 -0.011 0.013* 0.029* 0.029**
(0.846) (0.928) (0.133) (0.251) (0.056) (0.059) (0.023)
Population growth -0.088 -0.115 -0.253** -0.253** -0.115* 0.198 0.198**
(0.691) (0.957) (0.013) (0.035) (0.064) (0.105) (0.045)
Corruption Control  -0.295 -0.328 -0.634*** -0.634** -0.328** -0.217 -0.217
(0.445) (0.852) (0.004) (0.012) (0.016) (0.229) (0.118)
Government Effectiveness 0.294 0.231 0.607*** 0.607** 0.231** 0.359* 0.359**
(0.403) (0.901) (0.003) (0.010) (0.031) (0.070) (0.028)
HIV -0.006 -0.004 -0.006** -0.006* -0.004* -0.002 -0.002
(0.451) (0.946) (0.028) (0.071) (0.059) (0.418) (0.269)
Observations 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Notes.  Dependent variable is the physician emigration rate.  *,**,***,  denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.10) signify nations where  emigration is least. OLS:Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. MICs: Middle  
Income Countries.
4.1.2 Wealth effects for Nurse migration
Income-level effects for nurse-emigration  are captured by cross-examining Table 6 and 
Table 7.  The following broad findings could be established. (1) Economic prosperity is(not) a 
tool in the fight against emigration in top(low) quantiles of LICs and in low(top) quantiles of 
MICs.  (2)  Health  expenditure  and  savings  only  favor  brain-drain  in  both  income-groups  in 
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bottom  quantiles.  (3)  But  for  top  quantiles  of  MICs,  soaring  consumer  prices(inflation) 
increase(s) the likelihood of emigration in both income groups. (4) With the exception of low 
quantiles  of  LICs,  population  growth  appears  to  deter   emigration  of  health  workers.  (5) 
Democracy and press-freedom only encourage  the  phenomenon  with  much  relevance  in  top 
quantiles. 
Table 6: Determinants of Nurse Migration in LICs : OLS, LAD and QR
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.178 -0.001 -0.074 -0.074* -0.001 -0.238 -0.471*
(0.653) (0.998) (0.229) (0.074) (0.979) (0.284) (0.055)
Human  Development  0.057 -0.077 0.346** 0.346*** -0.077 0.596 0.137
(0.946) (0.956) (0.021) (0.001) (0.549) (0.222) (0.775)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.063 0.017 0.012 0.012* 0.017* 0.003 0.033
(0.322) (0.874) (0.200) (0.059) (0.085) (0.924) (0.348)
Trade -0.003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.004**
(0.292) (0.987) (0.632) (0.459) (0.837) (0.905) (0.030)
Democracy  0.021 0.010 0.006 0.006** 0.010** 0.025* 0.068***
(0.411) (0.823) (0.140) (0.032) (0.018) (0.096) (0.000)
Freedom 0.006 0.002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.002*** 0.002 0.014***
(0.128) (0.774) (0.693) (0.540) (0.003) (0.272) (0.000)
Observations  1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Specification 2
Constant 0.082 0.037 -0.038 -0.062*** 0.037*** 0.247 0.271*
(0.724) (0.908) (0.451) (0.000) (0.000) (0.215) (0.060)
Savings  0.0004 0.001 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.0003 0.001
(0.905) (0.912) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.625)
Health Expenditure  0.044 0.038 0.009 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.0005 -0.002
(0.370) (0.936) (0.372) (0.000) (0.000) (0.988) (0.923)
Inflation 0.011* 0.005 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.007 0.024***
(0.083) (0.948) (0.382) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000)
Development Assistance -0.012 -0.008 0.0006 0.0008*** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.000
(0.168) (0.870) (0.714) (0.000) (0.000) (0.636) (0.991)
Tertiary Emigration -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.0007*** -0.002*** -0.003 -0.006**
(0.318) (0.896) (0.168) (0.000) (0.000) (0.324) (0.014)
Observations 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Specification 3
Constant 0.256 0.276 0.001 0.034 0.276*** 0.304* 0.510***
(0.260) (0.575) (0.812) (0.621) (0.000) (0.064) (0.001)
Economic Prosperity  -0.007 -0.004 0.013*** 0.012* -0.004 -0.012 -0.064***
(0.727) (0.929) (0.000) (0.080) (0.391) (0.393) (0.000)
Population growth -0.047 -0.004 0.015*** 0.013 -0.004 -0.009 -0.051*
(0.351) (0.976) (0.000) (0.400) (0.704) (0.768) (0.064)
Corruption Control  0.037 0.125 -0.055*** -0.034 0.125** 0.141 0.242**
(0.844) (0.627) (0.000) (0.567) (0.022) (0.291) (0.030)
Government Effectiveness -0.123 -0.006 0.024*** 0.029 -0.006 -0.054 -0.415***
(0.489) (0.984) (0.001) (0.596) (0.884) (0.651) (0.001)
HIV -0.001 -0.004 0.0006 0.0003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.027***
(0.906) (0.850) (0.113) (0.923) (0.195) (0.445) (0.002)
Observations 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15 1-15
Notes.  Dependent variable is the nurse emigration rate.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify nations where  emigration is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. LICs: Low Income  
Countries.  
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(6) But for top quantiles in LICs, corruption-control(government effectiveness) is(not) a strong 
tool against  emigration.  (7) Human development only serves as  a(an) deterrent(incentive) in 
top(bottom) quantiles of MICs(LICs). (8) Development assistance and financial openness only 
serve to make matters worse. (9) The HIV infection rate and trade openness decrease emigration 
prospects. 
Table 7: Determinants of Nurse Migration in MICs : OLS, LAD and QR
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.300 -0.658 -0.205 -0.205 -0.658* -1.509*** -1.509***
(0.679) (0.952) (0.239) (0.231) (0.099) (0.000) (0.000)
Human  Development  -0.004 -0.004 0.0005 0.0005 -0.004 -0.003*** -0.003
(0.470) (0.999) (0.666) (0.659) (0.144) (0.000) (0.176)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.052 0.072 0.017 0.017 0.072** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.331) (0.679) (0.166) (0.159) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade -0.001 -0.0004 0.000 0.000 -0.0004 -0.003*** -0.003**
(0.662) (0.995) (0.958) (0.957) (0.625) (0.000) (0.015)
Democracy  0.058 0.086 0.019 0.019 0.086** 0.152*** 0.152***
(0.279) (0.928) (0.134) (0.128) (0.019) (0.000) (0.002)
Freedom 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.726) (0.958) (0.282) (0.273) (0.153) (0.000) (0.004)
Observations  1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Specification 2
Constant -0.157* -0.158 -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.158*** -0.041 -0.041**
(0.088) (0.836) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.259) (-0.041)
Savings  0.0009 0.0009 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.191) (0.904) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.384)
Health Expenditure  0.010 0.009 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.0003 0.0003
(0.182) (0.938) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917) (0.806)
Inflation 0.002 0.002 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** -0.0003 -0.000
(0.526) (0.894) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.816) (0.592)
Development Assistance 0.016** 0.017 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.011** 0.011***
(0.036) (0.658) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.001)
Tertiary Emigration 0.012*** 0.012 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Specification 3
Constant 0.892** 0.745 1.046*** 1.046*** 0.745*** 0.696*** 0.696***
(0.034) (0.855) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity  -0.006 0.005 -0.016** -0.016*** 0.005*** 0.006** 0.006***
(0.597) (0.982) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.024) (0.001)
Population growth -0.253* -0.183 -0.324*** -0.324*** -0.183*** -0.155*** -0.155***
(0.090) (0.932) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Corruption Control  -0.083 -0.041 -0.207** -0.207*** -0.041** -0.031 -0.031**
(0.661) (0.983) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.283) (0.027)
Government Effectiveness 0.193 0.105 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.105*** 0.117** 0.117***
(0.301) (0.961) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
HIV -0.015** -0.017 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.021) (0.564) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9 1-9
Notes.  Dependent variable is the nurse emigration rate.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles 
(e.g., Q 0.10) signify nations where  emigration is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. MICs: Middle Income  
Countries.  
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4.2  Discussion, policy implications and limitations
  
4.2.1  What do wealth-effects tell us?  
As summarized in Table 3, when existing emigration levels are low, wealth-effects have 
the following broad implications.  (1) Economic prosperity(health  expenditure)  is a good tool 
against  nurse(physician)  brain-drain  in  MICs(LICs).  (2)  Positive  demographic  change 
fuels(mitigates) the problem in LICs(MICs). (3) Savings, government-effectiveness, foreign-aid 
and inflationary pressures only accentuate the problem for both income groups. (4)Corruption-
control becomes a vital tool for emigration-control in both income-brackets. (5)Trade(financial) 
openness mitigates(fuels) physician(nurse) emigration in LICs. 
On the other hand when existing emigration levels are high the following establishments 
could  be  made.  (1)  Economic  prosperity(savings)  fight  nurse(physician)  emigration  only  in 
LICs(MICs).  (2)Health expenditure and inflationary pressures are relevant  tools in  the battle 
against  physician  resource  flight.  (3)Government  effectiveness(human  development)  is  an 
important  policy  measure  for  mitigating  emigration  in  LICs(MICs).  (4)Democracy,  press-
freedom,  foreign-aid  and  financial  openness  fuel  emigration  in  either  income  strata.  (5) 
Population growth and trade openness are important tools in the fight against brain-drain. (6) The 
HIV infection  rate is a deterrent only to nurse emigration. 
4.2.2 Further discussion on wealth-effects and policy recommendations  
  
Before delving into further discussing the significance of our results, it is important to 
emphasize  the  intuition  motivating  the  paper.  The  wealth-effect  dimension  is  critical  in  the 
understanding of the increasing flow of skilled professionals from low-income to high-income 
countries. The baseline push-factor is poverty(income disparity).  After assessing how wealth-
effects  play-out  when  emigration  levels  matter,  it  is  imperative  to  outline  general 
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recommendations  in  the  fight  against  this  phenomenon  of  brain-drain.  These  broad  policy 
measures integrate both the push and pull factors of HHR migration(albeit our analysis this far 
has  been  limited  only  to  push-factors).  In  substance  broad   policy  recommendations  are 
important because globalization is partially responsible in various ways for the chronic problems 
in  HHRs.  Deteriorating  socio-economic  and broader  environmental  conditions(at  least  partly 
attributable to liberalization or other forms of global market convergence) are pushing health 
workers out their countries. 
With  the  increasing  flow  of  skilled  professionals  from  low-income  to  high-income 
countries, there are often costs borne by poorer nations that are greater than the gains they may 
receive through remittances or reductions in domestic labor market inefficiencies and failures. 
These costs are particularly high when the skilled professionals are health workers coming from 
countries facing critical shortages in health workers. A broad policy solution must find a fine 
balance between the private welfare gains of remittance and the public cost of lost  training- 
revenues; between the aggregate GDP gains of remittance and the(often engendered) individual 
or local  losses to families  or communities  left  behind;  and between the individual’s  right  to 
migrate to greener pastures and the loss of access to health care for communities. Maximizing 
equity in health outcomes(between and within countries) in the context of such flows requires 
strategies that simultaneously address push and pull factors. These strategies in-turn will require 
net  capital  transfers(wealth  flows)  from  richer  to  poorer  countries(and  from  healthier  to 
unhealthier  populations).  For  organizational  purposes  we shall  classify  the  recommendations 
with respect to source-countries , receiving-states and regional(international) institutions.
23
a) Recommendations  for source-countries 
-Improve  job  security  and  HHR  planning  by  easing  re-entry  for  HHRs  seeking  temporary 
employment  abroad,  giving  priority  to  training  and  not  committing  to  free  trade  of  health 
services in trade treaties without prior experience in regulating such trade. 
-Improve registration, examination and deployment procedures for foreign-trained HHRs. These 
include confining new foreign HHRs to employment in the public sector with priority given to 
rural or underserved areas.
-Ensure the training curricula meet local needs(rather than export-market needs) and develop 
mid-level professionals capable of meeting local needs and less likely to migrate.
-Improve retention incentives in health services by providing benefits(extra pay for instance) in 
rural/underserved areas, better management and career paths, supportive supervision and greater 
priority in public health expenditure.
-Decrease economic and political push factors, with donor aid(assistance) and other capital flows 
from rich to poor nations.
-Increase public-good contribution from the Diaspora through novel matching and tax incentives, 
including  bilateral  tax  agreements  permitting  taxes  by  emigrants  to  be  paid  directly  to 
governments of  their home countries.
b) Recommendations for receiving countries
-Creation of bilateral  agreements to regulate  the recruiting  process, ensure that the costs  of 
migration are borne by the receiving and not the source country. Measures should also be taken 
to improve country of origin development-contributions of the Diaspora.
-Adoption and enforcement of ethical codes of conduct in the recruitment of imported HHRs.
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-Improved self-sufficiency in HHR production through increased training, better use of existing 
unlicensed foreign-trained HHRs and ensuring that poor working conditions do not push some 
domestic HHRs(especially nurses) away from the health sector. 
-Increased contributions to health systems of source countries through guaranteed salaries for 
remaining  health  professionals  and  sustained  targeting  of  health-aid.  Bilateral  agreements 
creating new tax measures  through which public-good remittances  can improve financing of 
health and training systems. 
-Improved  ‘return’  or  two-way HHR flows  through  time-limited  visas  or  guaranteed  return 
privileges for emigrants returning home after service-leaves. Equality in the two-way staff flow 
will ensure the source countries does not experience a loss of staff and at the same time would 
benefit from new knowledge brought by health practitioners from recipient countries. This will 
minimize the negative externalities of HHR flows from source to receiving countries.
c) Recommendations for regional and international institutions(mechanisms)
-Ensure human rights monitoring, through, inter alia, the office of the Special  Rapporteur on 
Health in which countries report and recommend measures they are implementing in a bid to 
reduce factors pushing health workers to emigrate. 
-Support  for  the Global  Health  Workforce  Alliance  which  seeks  to  identify  and resolve the 
problems surrounding health worker migration.
-Re-examine  macroeconomic  conditions  that  may  impede  health  care  expansion  in  least 
developed(low-income)  source  countries,  particularly  budgetary  ceilings  associated  with 
IMF/World Bank Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks that indirectly prevent expansion of 
health care spending in many of the worst affected countries.
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-Develop cross-border public health care agreements based on arrangements now evolving in the 
European Union. This will  mitigate the drain created by private health care owing to “medical 
tourism”. 
5.Conclusion
Owing  to  lack  of  relevant  data  on  health  human  resource  migration,  the  empirical 
dimension of the health-worker  crisis  debate has remained void despite  abundant  theoretical 
literature. A health worker crisis is overwhelming the world. Shortages in health professionals 
are reaching staggering levels in many parts of the globe. This paper has complemented existing 
literature  by  empirically  investigating  the  WHO hypothetical  determinants  of  health-worker 
migration in the context of globalization when income-levels matter. Thus we  have assessed the 
determinants  of   emigration  in  the  health  sector  through-out  the  conditional  distributions  of 
emigration  rates(physicians  and  nurses).  Findings  have  provided  very  targeted  policy 
implications based on income-levels and existing emigration levels for both physician and nurse 
worker crises. Apart from specific policy recommendations, we have also outlined broad policy 
measures for source-countries, recipient-states and regional(international) institutions.
26
Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variables
Physician  Emigration 0.376 0.174 0.090 0.750 24
Nurse Emigration 0.166 0.185 0.010 0.780 24
Independent & 
Control Variables
Human Development 2.270 9.055 0.219 44.783 24
Foreign Direct Investment 2.951 3.102 0.479 15.792 24
Trade 70.732 37.665 27.688 166.14 24
Democracy 3.291 4.069 -8.000 10.000 24
Freedom 54.208 21.419 17.000 85.000 24
Savings 10.518 16.309 -25.00 59.310 24
Health  Expenditure 5.111 1.439 2.111 8.465 24
Tertiary education emigration 17.897 14.437 2.557 55.965 24
Inflation 8.458 9.090 -0.881 29.581 24
Development Assistance 8.905 7.655 0.366 25.587 24
GDP per capita growth 1.037 3.701 -6.097 8.290 24
Population growth 2.610 1.070 0.982 6.686 24
Corruption-Control -0.440 0.546 -1.127 0.737 24
Government Effectiveness -0.550 0.573 -1.491 0.578 24
HIV  Infection Ratio  7.558 7.922 0.200 26.000 24
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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  Appendix 2: Correlation analysis and presentation of countries 
Panel A: Correlation Analysis 
Dep. Variables Independent and control variables
Physic Nurses IHDI FDI Trade Demo Free Savings HExp. TerEmi Infl. NODA GDPpcg Popg CofC GE HIV
1.000 0.332 -0.203 0.087 0.075 -0.031 0.044 -0.043 0.053 0.611 0.409 0.530 -0.002 0.085 -0.145 0.003 -0.098 Physic
1.000 -0.131 -0.037 -0.030 0.231 -0.063 -0.054 0.026 0.382 0.285 0.100 0.016 -0.267 0.033 -0.025 -0.352 Nurses
1.000 -0.163 -0.093 0.300 -0.292 0.114 0.493 -0.150 -0.073 -0.244 0.040 -0.031 0.347 0.424 0.233 IHDI
1.000 0.635 -0.561 0.047 -0.293 0.135 -0.016 -0.016 -0.161 0.410 -0.409 0.104 0.065 0.377 FDI
1.000 -0.139 -0.000 0.148 0.006 0.145 0.054 -0.385 0.557 -0.494 0.444 0.240 0.443 Trade
1.000 -0.623 0.415 -0.052 0.117 0.027 0.031 -0.080 -0.072 0.471 0.480 -0.217 Demo
1.000 -0.129 -0.207 -0.083 0.193 -0.000 -0.171 0.126 -0.670 -0.742 -0.001 Free
1.000 -0.441 0.197 -0.284 -0.399 0.327 -0.234 0.177 0.114 -0.064 Savings
1.000 -0.071 0.391 0.249 -0.154 -0.136 0.220 0.382 0.440 HExp.
1.000 0.110 0.130 0.153 0.061 -0.007 0.192 -0.295 TerEmi.
1.000 0.561 -0.067 -0.104 0.010 0.010 0.275 Infl.
1.000 -0.406 0.465 -0.290 -0.166 -0.082 NODA
1.000 -0.370 0.354 0.286 0.234 GDPpcg
1.000 -0.251 -0.173 -0.266 Popg
1.000 0.842 0.346 CoC
1.000 0.367 GE
1.000 HIV 
Panel B:  Presentation of countries(24)
Low Income Countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Togo, Uganda & Zambia.
Middle Income Countries Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland. 
Dep: Dependent. Physic: Physicians. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. Free: Press Freedom. HExp: Health Expenditure. TerEmi:  
Tertiary Emigration. Infl: Inflation. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Popg: Population growth. CofC: Control of Corruption. GE: Government  Effectiveness.  
HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus. 
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